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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH NEIGHBORS ADAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
FLORETTA LANG, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 8141 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Honorable Martin J\1. Larson, Judge 
MOSS & HYDE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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IN THE S.UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
RUTH NEIGHBORS ADAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant7 
-vs.-
FLORETTA LANG, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEJ\1ENT OF FACTS 
No. 8141 
This is an appeal fron1 a jury verdict and judgment 
thereon, no cause of action. 
On the 15th ·day of December, 1952, the plaintiff and 
defendant, vvith Mrs. Jaques and Bob Adan1son, were 
driving west past the l\Iagna Mill between Magna and 
Garfield in Salt Lake County. It was still dark. Defend-
ant was driving and was traveling "not to exceed forty" 
miles per hour (R. 80). As they rounded a curve ''the 
car started to skid on the ice.'' ( R. 82). ''We slid to our 
left." (R. 82). The car recrossed the highway and went 
over the edge of a fifteen-foot (15) hank down onto the 
railroad tracks ( R. 84). There were icy spots here and 
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there on the road that morning. (R. 88). When the ear 
first left the road, it traveled 90 feet along a hillside son1e 
five feet off the road. Then it returned to the highway 
and traveled across it so1ne 47 feet and "rent over a cliff. 
(R. 93, 94). ''It was foggy that morning." (R. 122). 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO EXCLUDE TESTI-
MONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AS TO SPEED OF VE-
HICLE BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. 
ARGUMENT 
S. S. Taylor 'vas called as an expert witness in re-
buttal to testify as to the sp·eed of the Pontiac car at the 
time it started to skid. His qualifications as an expert 
were admitte·d (R. 237). He was asked a hypothetical 
question based on evidence admitted and in the record 
(R. 245, 246). Objection was made and sustained on the 
ground that the question was incompetent, irrelevant, 
and immaterial, not proper rebuttal, and as not assum-
ing all of the facts of the case. After some clarifying 
questions and answers and a further objection, the Court 
became very angry and again sustained the objection on 
the groun·ds that the witness could not be asked a hypo-
thetical question on facts not in ''this record in the first 
place; second place, it isn't rebuttal." (R. 248). The wit-
ness 'vas then asked if he had an opinion as to speed, 
and objection vvas made. The Court sustained the objec-
tion to the question as ""·holly irrelevant." (R. 249). 
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It is subn1itted that every fact included in the hypo-
thetical question ha:d been testified to by one or more 
\vitnesses and "'ras and is in the record. Besides, the ex-
pert \vitness had hilnself viewed the scene at least t\vice 
and had made certain measurements and observations. 
Under these circumstances, the question was competent, 
relevant, and material. An expert witness may be asked 
a hypothetical question based partly on personal observa-
tion and partly on premises supplied by hypothesis. I I 
Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 678. Moreover, a hypothetical 
question need not cover all the facts which the questioner 
alleges in his case, so long as it includes facts on which 
there is or will be admissable evidence. II Wigmore on 
Evidence Sec. '682; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Drake 
(CCA Cal.) 89 F. 2d 47. 
A hypothetical question rnay be fran1ed upon any 
theory of interrogator which can reasonably be deduced 
from evidence, assumptions may be indulged on any fact 
within evidence, and facts not deemed material may be 
onritted. See Christiansen v. Hollings (Cal.) 112 P. 2d 
723. 
Certainly the expert opinion sought by the question 
"\\"as not irrelevant. Speed of the vehicle at the point of 
skidding was an essential element of the allegations of 
negligence. Every witness in the case (except the doctor 
and Mr. Adams) had testified as to speed. 
In Stamper v. Scholt.:; (Tex.) 29 SW 2d 883 the 
Court 'held that ''evidence of experts was perruissible to 
show, from the circurnstances detailed to them, as to -vvhat 
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the probable speed of the auton1obile "~a~ at the tinw 
the boy was struck.'' 
Finally, expert opinion as to speed ,,~as proper re-
buttal. Plaintiff's witnesses had testified as to speed. 
Defendant produced witnesses who testified to a les8er 
speed. In rebuttal plaintiff sought to show, through ex-
pert opinion based on certain physical factors, that the 
speed of the vehicle was greater than testified by defend-
ant's witnesses. The trial court ruled that the evidence 
of speed by defendant could not be rebutted. 
The erroneous rulings of the trial court excluding 
expert testimony on the crucial issue of speed was pre-
judicial to plaintiff and her cause. The effect "\\ras to 
leave before the jury uncontradicted evidence of a lesser 
speed than that actually traveled by vehicle at the time 
and place in question. 
CONCLUSION 
The erroneous rulings of the· trial court excluding 
the rebuttal testimony of the expert witness prejudiced 
the plaintiff in the presentation of her case. The verdict 
and judgment should be reversed, and plaintiff should 
·he grante·d a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOSS & HYDE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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